Tractatus 5.6-5.621

  1. Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte 1
  1. 1 Universitat de València
    info

    Universitat de València

    Valencia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/043nxc105

Journal:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Year of publication: 2021

Issue Title: The significance of the Tractatus

Volume: 40

Issue: 2

Pages: 133-150

Type: Article

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More publications in: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Abstract

Against usual interpretations, this article defends that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein presents a completely original and purely logical, not at all epistemological, argument in defense of the truth of the solipsist answer to the philosophical question of the relation between thought, language and world

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