The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market

  1. Rafael Moner-Colonques
  2. Santiago J. Rubio
Revista:
Economía agraria y recursos naturales

ISSN: 1578-0732

Año de publicación: 2015

Volumen: 15

Número: 1

Páginas: 11-40

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.7201/EARN.2015.01.02 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Economía agraria y recursos naturales

Resumen

En este trabajo se evalúa el uso estratégico de la innovación por dos empresas contaminantes para influir en la política ambiental. El análisis se desarrolla comparando dos regímenes de política alternativos para dos instrumentos: impuestos y estándares. El primero de los regímenes supone que el regulador se compromete con un nivel ex-ante del instrumento de política. En el segundo, no hay compromiso. Los resultados muestran que cuando no hay compromiso y se utiliza un impuesto para controlar las emisiones, el comportamiento estratégico de las empresas mejora el bienestar si la eficiencia de las tecnologías limpias es relativamente baja. Si este no es el caso, el comportamiento estratégico de los duopolistas tiene un efecto perjudicial sobre el bienestar independientemente del instrumento de política utilizado para controlar las emisiones.

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Información de financiación

Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees and Francisco André for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness under project ECO2013-45045-R, and Generalitat Valenciana under project PROMETEO/2014 /Fase II.

Financiadores

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