Lies, More Lies and Still More Lies

  1. Marc Artiga
Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2023

Volumen: 42

Número: 1

Páginas: 53-75

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Resumen

In a series of works, Grimaltos and Rosell (2017, 2021) have characterized two different kinds of lies, ‘doxogenic’ and ‘falsifying’ lies, and have employed this distinction to defend two interesting claims: that a correct analysis of deceptive lying has to necessarily include the speaker’s intentions and that no unified definition of lying can be provided. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, I will vindicate Grimaltos and Rosell’s distinction between different kinds of deceptive lies and I will argue that, following their reasoning, one can actually identify many more types of lies. Second, despite this agreement, I will argue that multiplying the types of lies by appealing to different kinds of intentions does not show that a unified definition of lying is unattainable.

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