The Search for Generality in the Notion of Mechanism

  1. Saúl Pérez-González
Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 38

Número: 3

Páginas: 77-94

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Resumen

In this paper, I introduce and discuss a general principle shared by new mechanists: the search for generality. New mechanists agree that an appropriate notion of mechanism has to be suitable for most of the fields of science where mechanisms are relevant. The development of general notions of mechanism is pursued with two different and alternative strategies, which I call the extrapolation strategy and the across-the-sciences strategy. After analysing paradigmatic examples of them, I argue that both strategies face outstanding difficulties and that the prospects for overcoming them are dim. It is concluded that it would be advisable to abandon the search for generality.

€ Ver financiación

Información de financiación

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Marc Artiga, Raffaella Campaner, and Valeriano Iranzo for their valuable comments. This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities under grants FPU16/03274 and FFI2017-89639-P.

Financiadores

Referencias bibliográficas

  • ANDERSEN, H. K. (2011), ‘Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 78, pp. 325-331.
  • ANDERSEN, H. K. (2014), ‘A Field Guide to Mechanisms: Part I’, Philosophy Compass, vol. 9, pp. 274-283.
  • BARROS, D. B. (2008), ‘Natural Selection as a Mechanism’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 75, pp. 306-322.
  • BEATTY, J. H. (1995), ‘The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis’, in Woltersand, G. and Lennox, J. G. (eds.), Concepts, Theories, and Rationality in the Biological Sciences. The Second Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, MIT Press, pp. 45-81.
  • BECHTEL, W. and ABRAHAMSEN, A. (2005), ‘Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 36, pp. 421-441.
  • BECHTEL, W. and ABRAHAMSEN, A (2010), ‘Dynamic Mechanistic Explanation: Computational Modelling of Circadian Rhythms as an Exemplar for Cognitive Science’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 41, pp. 321-333.
  • BECHTEL, W. and RICHARDSON, R. C. (1993), Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
  • BELL, G. (2008), Selection. The Mechanism of Evolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • BELL, G. (2014), ‘The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation’, in Kaiser, M. I., Scholz, O. R., Plenge, D. and Hüttemann, A. (eds.), Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Case of Biology and History, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 27-52.
  • CRAVER, C. F. (2007), Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
  • CRAVER, C. F. and ALEXANDROVA, A. (2008), ‘No Revolution Ncessary: Neural Mechanisms for Economics’, Economics and Philosophy, vol. 24, pp. 381-406.
  • CRAVER, C. F. and DARDEN, L. (2013), In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries across the Life Sciences, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
  • DARDEN, L. (2018), ‘Strategies for Discovering mechanisms’, in Glennan, S. and Illari, P. M. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 255-266.
  • DESAUTELS, L. (2016), ‘Natural Selection and Mechanistic Regularity’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 57, pp. 13-23.
  • ELSTER, J. (1989), Nuts and Bolts for Social Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • ELSTER, J. (1999), Alchemies of the Mind. Rationality and the Emotions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • GLENNAN, S. (2002), ‘Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 69, pp. S342-S353.
  • GLENNAN, S. (2005), ‘Modeling Mechanisms’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 36, pp. 443-464.
  • GLENNAN, S. (2017), The New Mechanical Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • GLENNAN, S. and ILLARI, P. M. (2018), ‘Introduction: Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophies’, in Glennan, S. and Illari, P. M. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 1-9.
  • GLENNAN, S. S. (1996), ‘Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation’, Erkenntnis, vol. 44, pp. 49-71.
  • HEDSTRÖM, P. (2005), Dissecting the Social. On the Principles of Analytical Sociology, New York, Cambridge University Press.
  • HEDSTRÖM, P. and YLIKOSKI P. (2011), ‘Analytical Sociology’, in Jarvie, I. C. and Zamora-Bonilla, J. (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of The Philosophy of Social Sciences, London, SAGE Publications, pp. 386-398.
  • HEMPEL, C. G. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York, The Free press.
  • HERRON, J. C. and FREEMAN, S. (2014), Evolutionary Analysis, Upper Saddle River, Pearson Education.
  • ILLARI, P. M. (2013), ‘Mechanistic Explanation: Integrating the Ontic and Epistemic’, Erkenntnis, vol. 78, pp. 237-255.
  • ILLARI, P. M. and WILLIAMSON, J. (2010), ‘Function and Organization: Comparing the Mechanisms of Protein Synthesis and Natural Selection’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 41, pp. 279-291.
  • ILLARI, P. M. and WILLIAMSON, J. (2012), ‘What is a Mechanism? Thinking about Mechanisms across the Sciences’, European Journal of Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, pp. 119-135.
  • KAISER, M. I. (2018), ‘The Components and Boundaries of Mechanisms’, in Glennan, S. and Illari, P. M. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 116-130.
  • KUORIKOSKI, J. (2009), ‘Two Concepts of Mechanism: Componential Causal System and Abstract Form of Interaction’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 23, pp. 143-160.
  • LEURIDAN, B. (2010), ‘Can Mechanisms Really Replace Laws of Nature?’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 77, pp. 317-340.
  • LEURIDAN, B. (2012), ‘Three Problems for the Mutual Manipulability Account of Constitutive Relevance in Mechanisms’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 63, pp. 399-427.
  • MACHAMER, P., DARDEN L. and CRAVER, C. F. (2000), ‘Thinking about Mechanisms’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, pp. 1-25.
  • MITCHELL, S. D. (1997), ‘Pragmatic Laws’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 64, pp. S468S479.
  • PÉREZ-GONZÁLEZ, S. and LUQUE, V. J. (2019), ‘Evolutionary Causes as Mechanisms: A Critical Analysis’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, vol. 41, pp. 1-23.
  • REISS, J. (2008), Error in Economics. Towards a More Evidence-Based Methodology, Abingdon, Routledge.
  • ROSENBERG, A. (2018), ‘Making Mechanism Interesting’, Synthese, vol. 195, pp. 11-33.
  • SALMON, W. C. (1989), Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
  • SAMUELSON, P. A. and NORDHAUS, W. D. (2010), Economics, Boston, McGrawHill/Irwin.
  • SCRIVEN, M. (1959), ‘Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory’, Science, vol. 130, pp. 477-482.
  • SKIPPER, R. A. and MILLSTEIN, R. L. (2005), ‘Thinking about Evolutionary Mechanisms: Natural Selection’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 36, pp. 327-347.
  • WOODWARD, J. (2002), ‘What is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 69, pp. S366-S377.
  • WOODWARD, J. (2003), Making Things Happen, New York, Oxford University Press.
  • WOODWARD, J. (2011), ‘Mechanisms Revisited’, Synthese, vol. 183, pp. 409-427.
  • YLIKOSKI, P. (2012), ‘Micro, Macro, and Mechanisms’, in Kincaid, H. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 21-45.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet