Las fuentes del escepticismo

  1. Duncan Pritchard
  2. Vicente Raga Rosaleny
Journal:
Estudios de Filosofía

ISSN: 0121-3628,  2256-358X

Year of publication: 2019

Issue Title: Escepticismo

Issue: 60

Pages: 239-266

Type: Article

DOI: 10.17533/10.17533/UDEA.EF.N60A12 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Estudios de Filosofía

Sustainable development goals

Abstract

It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct subproblems—a formulation that turns on the closure principle, and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal—at least when properly formulated—can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere—with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism.

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