La conciencia irreductiblelos bastiones De Mcginn y Velmans

  1. Correcher Valls, Juan Francisco
Journal:
Thémata: Revista de filosofía

ISSN: 0212-8365,  2253-900X

Year of publication: 2013

Issue: 47

Pages: 79-101

Type: Article

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Abstract

This paper reviews two authors who are relevant in contemporary philosophy of mind because of their antireductionist arguments and theses regarding mind-body problem. Colin McGinn is the best representative of new mysterianism, position that considers the mind-body connection as a mystery in virtue of a cognitive closure which prevents us from understanding that link. On the other hand, Max Velmans proposes a double-aspect theory in the tradition of Spinoza called reflexive monism. After reviewing these approaches, some objections will be reviewed as well.

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