Sistema de atribución de responsabilidad penal a las personas jurídicas

Résumé

This dissertation approaches the analysis of legal persons� appointment of criminal responsibility model in the Spanish legal system, established by the organic law LO 5/2010 from the Criminal Code Reform. As well as some brief review about the legislative, historic and comparative law evolution, the most important problems of corporate criminal responsibility are studied. Some of the latter are incapacity of action and legal person�s guilt, some distinguishing aspects between disciplinary administrative law and criminal law, prevention systems through a compliance program, procedural matters and the case-law more relevant on the subject. In an independent way, it is brought up for discussion if criminal responsibility, as maintained by some authors, implies not only the birth of a new subject for this branch of law, but also if this subject, in the post-industrial age, has replaced the natural person as the real main character of social and legal relationships (dehumanized theory). KEY WORDS: Criminal responsibility, legal person, company, anti-juridicity, guilt, compliance program, disciplinary administrative, communicative action, criminal proceeding. METHODOLOGY: Domestic and foreign study of legal bibliography, technical journals and jurisprudence basis; Attendance and participation in courses and research projects on the criminal liability of legal persons. CONCLUSIONS: 1. - Criminal responsibility establishment of legal person is only due to criminal policy reasons. There is no legal or philosophical fundamental which maintains the supposed legal person's ability to be an active subject in criminal law. 2. - Legal persons� responsibility different models have been increased in comparative law, although this growth is not uniform in terms of its criminal nature. In the most recent history it was precisely the disciplinary administrative law the one which contained (by creating it) the liability of the legal person. 3. - Criminal responsibility of legal person distorts the criminal law. The legal person has not the ability of action or guilt. It is only an assets purpose. 4. - None of the theories built by the doctrine in order to justify the criminal responsibility of legal persons (normative spirit, practical, company personality, organization defect, constructivist corporate culture, etc. . .) is adjusted to the principle of legality when connecting fact and guilt. 5 - The conceptual ambiguity of Article 31 bis allows the case-law to shape and define with absolute freedom the legal person�s criminal liability model. That fact infringes principles such as legality and taxativity of criminal law, legal certainty or prohibition of an over interpretation of criminal rule. 6. - Article 31a sets a responsibility model by transfer, combining identification and a vicarious liability system. It is not possible to pick out liability from the fact itself. So that, everything is confined to an objective fact which can only cause an objective liability. Accepting the idea of corporate guilt involves also the acceptance of a simple theoretical and extremely speculative point of view. 7. - It has been accepted , as it could not be any other way, that legal persons take part in the legal �economic traffic, and they even get to participate in criminal activities . However, that involvement, which is purely instrumental, cannot be a direct but indirect object of Criminal Law. 8. - From procedural perspectives I understand that legislator improvises the legal person procedural statute.