El debat sobre l'estructura causal de la teoria evolutivalleis, forces i analogies

  1. Luque, Víctor J. 1
  1. 1 Universitat de València
    info

    Universitat de València

    Valencia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/043nxc105

Revista:
Quaderns de filosofia

ISSN: 2341-1414

Año de publicación: 2021

Volumen: 8

Número: 1

Páginas: 63-98

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.7203/QFIA.8.1.20655 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Quaderns de filosofia

Resumen

Resum: Aquest article analitza l’estructura de la teoria evolutiva i les discussions produïdes als seu voltant en les últimes dècades. En primer lloc, presente l’anomenada “interpretació de forces” o “analogia newtoniana” i la seua estructura basada en l’elaboració de tres lleis fonamentals. Més endavant, mostre les crítiques a aquesta interpretació per diferents autors, en especial l’anomenada “versió estadística” de la teoria evolutiva. Posteriorment, analitze la idoneïtat de la interpretació de forces i elabore una reformulació de la mateixa que permet explicar el seu sorgiment i la seua utilitat dins de la literatura biològica. Abstract: This article analyses the structure of evolutionary theory and the debates emerged in the last decades regarding its causal status. First, I present the so-called “force interpretation” or “Newtonian analogy”, and its structure based on three fundamental laws. Second, I outline several criticisms on this interpretation, specially by the so-called “statistical view” of evolutionary theory. Finally, I analyse the suitability of the force interpretation and elaborate a new formulation of this interpretation. This allows me to explain the emergence of this interpretation in the past and its current utility in the biological literature. Paraules clau: teoria evolutiva, estructura causal, interpretació de forces, visió estadística, forces evolutives, equació de Price. Keywords: evolutionary theory, causal structure, force interpretation, statistical view, evolutionary forces, Price equation.

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