IntroductionExplanation in Science

  1. Valeriano Iranzo 1
  1. 1 Universitat de València
    info

    Universitat de València

    Valencia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/043nxc105

Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 38

Número: 3

Páginas: 5-23

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Resumen

La presente introducción contiene dos partes. En la primera se ofrece una visión general de las principales posiciones defendidas en el debate filosófico sobre la explicación científica. En la segunda se resumen y comparan los seis artículos incluidos en la sección monográfica.

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Información de financiación

Research leading to this monographic section has been supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO), Spain, project FFI2016-76799-P

Financiadores

Referencias bibliográficas

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