Los impactos distributivos de las reformas institucionales

  1. Fernando Toboso 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Valencia Departamento de Economía Aplicada
Revista:
Investigación económica

ISSN: 0185-1667

Año de publicación: 2013

Volumen: 72

Número: 286

Páginas: 3-34

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/S0185-1667(13)72600-6 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Investigación económica

Resumen

El objetivo aquí perseguido es doble. Por una parte, se pretende mostrar que la afirmación de que los nuevos institucionalistas no prestan atención a los aspectos distributivos puede ser refutada. Para ello se examinarán algunos trabajos de destacados autores en esta tradición analítica. En segundo lugar, el trabajo acomete la revisión y ampliación de un instrumental gráfico muy conocido y nada heterodoxo a fin de realizar un análisis sistemático y muy persuasivo de las principales vías por las que una reforma institucional provoca impactos distributivos, además de influir sobre el volumen total de los costos de transacción que soportan los participantes en cada entorno institucional. Dicho análisis también permite resaltar que las reglas que unos agentes perciben como causantes de los costos de transacción que ellos soportan son vistas por otros como los mecanismos que les pueden permitir, finalmente, obtener mejores resultados distributivos, al menos a corto plazo, incluso aunque hayan de incurrir en los habituales costos de transacción asociados a toda negociación. Aunque estas ideas resultan ciertamente ajenas al proceder investigador de muchos nuevos institucionalistas, no es así en el caso de otros como North, Eggertsson, Libecap, Ostrom e incluso Williamson y Ménard. Evidentemente, esta dimensión distributiva suele ser objeto de gran preocupación por parte de investigadores que trabajan en el marco de otras corrientes de análisis, pero el objetivo del trabajo no consiste en examinar esas otras aportaciones, sino en mostrar que estos aspectos están ganando más y más espacio en el ámbito de la nueva economía institucional.

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