The role of Politics and Economics in the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Adoption

  1. ARACELI MORA 1
  1. 1 Universitat de València
    info

    Universitat de València

    Valencia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/043nxc105

Revista:
Estudios de economía aplicada

ISSN: 1133-3197,  1697-5731

Año de publicación: 2018

Título del ejemplar: Efectos de las Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera (NIIF) en los estados financieros de las empresas

Volumen: 36

Número: 2

Páginas: 407-428

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.25115/EEA.V36I2.2537 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Estudios de economía aplicada

Resumen

La adopción de las NIIF desde 2005 ha conllevado beneficios, pero la investigación también ha demostrado que su efecto no ha sido uniforme en los distintos países debido a las diferencias institucionales y en los incentivos. La teoría contractual ofrece un marco teórico para la investigación de las consecuencias económicas y de los incentivos de los grupos de interés para ejercer presión, pero la investigación sobre la actividad de los políticos para interferir en la contabilidad es escasa. El objetivo de este estudio es mostrar el papel de los gobiernos en la contabilidad. Para ello se muestran los cambios acontecidos en el proceso de adopción de las NIIF en la UE para incrementar la interferencia política en nombre del “interés público”, destacando el caso del sector financiero. Se concluye que todas las partes involucradas deberían comprometerse a buscar el equilibrio entre normas basadas en principios y mecanismos de control para mejorar el proceso de comparabilidad con las NIIF.

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