Una aproximació intrasubjecte a la teoria prospectiva

  1. Bonavia Martin, Tomas
  2. González, Marta
Revista:
Anuari de psicologia de la Societat Valenciana de Psicologia

ISSN: 1135-1268

Ano de publicación: 2017

Título do exemplar: Homenatge a L. Kohlberg i D. Kahneman

Volume: 18

Número: 2

Páxinas: 253-267

Tipo: Artigo

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Outras publicacións en: Anuari de psicologia de la Societat Valenciana de Psicologia

Resumo

In the present study, we have revisited the research carried out by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which was the origin of their Prospec Theory. The importance of this theory comes from, on the one hand, the criticism about the expected utility theory and, on the other hand, the fact that it allowed the formulation of the certainty effect, the reflection effect and the frame effect. These authors generally used in their studies between-subject experimental designs. Our hypothesis was to test whether these effects remain the same even though we have conducted a within-subject analysis. For this purpose, we took a sample of 106 participants, to whom we asked a series of questions based on profits and losses problems. After repeating this study 5 times, the results showed that, as we had expected, the certainty effect, the reflection effect and the frame effect that Kahneman has identified were all still present, despite having used a within-subjectdesign.

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