Hegel's Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom

  1. Edgar Maraguat
Revue:
Revista de filosofía

ISSN: 0034-8244 1988-284X

Année de publication: 2016

Número: 41

Pages: 111-134

Type: Article

DOI: 10.5209/REV_RESF.2016.V41.N1.52110 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccès ouvert editor

D'autres publications dans: Revista de filosofía

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Résumé

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

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