Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs

  1. Pedro Mendi 1
  2. Rafael Moner-Colonques 2
  3. José J. Sempere-Monerris 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Navarra
    info

    Universidad de Navarra

    Pamplona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02rxc7m23

  2. 2 Universitat de València
    info

    Universitat de València

    Valencia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/043nxc105

Aldizkaria:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Argitalpen urtea: 2011

Alea: 2

Zenbakia: 3

Orrialdeak: 359-378

Mota: Artikulua

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-010-0034-3 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openSarbide irekia editor

Beste argitalpen batzuk: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Laburpena

This article presents a link between tariff rates and industry structure in a dynamic setting. We examine the role of tariffs on final-goods in a firm’s decision to integrate and collude in the presence of competitive imports. It is shown that, under some conditions, the upstream firm has an incentive to engage in vertical integration to introduce profitably a wholesale price above the world input price while not inducing any intermediate or final good imports. Higher tariffs downstream, even with no tariff protection upstream, make this strategy more profitable, and provide a rationale for a positive relationship between tariff protection and vertical integration, which is observed in some industries.

Datuen iturria: Dialnet