Inferential knowledge and incremental confirmation

  1. Iranzo García, Valeriano
Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2014

Volumen: 33

Número: 3

Páginas: 125-138

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Referencias bibliográficas

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