Decisiones de consumoUn ejemplo usando una solución dinámica "Cournot-Nash"

Resumen

In recent years there have been numerous studies about the formation of the savings rate. However, little attention has been paid to the growing incorporation of women to the labour market on the concumption decision making of households. This decision making changes when both partners have utility functions which are combined inside the household. In this situation, duopolistic behaviours can take place and the final result -the stock of wealth or savings- will depend on the strategy, co-operative or not, followed by the participants. Our model has two basic features: the underlying stock of wealth changes as a result of the actions of both participants, and each participants takes in account of the other's actions. This strategic aspect is studied, for example, by using the concept of a Cournot- Nash equilibrium in which each partner's reaction depends on the stock of wealth and not on previous behaviour. This, the model is a discreet-time alogue of a differential game. The paper examines the dynamic and steady- state proporties of savings level that result from the participants' interactions.