Ley singular y ejecución de sentencias firmesuna reflexión con motivo de la Ley Orgánica 1/2024, de 10 de junio, de Amnistía para la normalización institucional, política y social en Cataluña.

Abstract

This paper proposes an analysis - exclusively - of the constitutionality and legality of Organic Law 1/2024 from a very exceptional perspective dealt with in the comments to said Organic Law. This Law claims for itself, with emphasis and in order to try to settle the objection formulated during its parliamentary processing consisting of the fact that it would violate the fundamental right to equality, the character of a singular law, only dictated to resolve a specific factual situation. And this insistent self-qualification made by the Legislator gives rise to the need to contrast it with the constitutional jurisprudence dictated in relation, precisely, to the requirements of validity of singular laws, in particular when these are dictated with the sole purpose of preventing the execution of final sentences. The provisions of the Organic Law that refer to amnesty in relation to final judgments do not respect the requirements of constitutional jurisprudence, precisely because they are aimed exclusively at preventing compliance with those judgments, and therefore emptying of content the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (article 24.1 CE). The extremely elementary and merely formalistic citation of article 18.3 of the LOPJ (a provision that regulates the right to the execution of sentences, specifying in its section 3 that “The provisions of this article are understood without prejudice to the right of clemency, the exercise of which, in accordance with the Constitution and the laws, corresponds to the King”) does not amend or affect the need to correctly interpret and articulate the fundamental right to the execution of sentences with one of the abstract measures of clemency, amnesty, in particular when it is instrumented as a singular law enacted exclusively to prevent the execution of sentences within the framework of the Constitution, as an essential requirement to guarantee the separation of powers and the effectiveness of the fundamental right, delimiting in a precise and constitutionally admissible manner the constitutionally admissible scope of amnesty.